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Abstract: Spinoff firms are a distinct class of new entrants across industries. 
The causes for their emergence have been widely investigated in the literature. 
However, the role of team environments has received little attention. On the one 
hand, talented individuals may find it necessary to team up with others to utilise 
complementary knowledge and generate synergies. On the other hand, some 
types of team production environments may exhibit dissonance and motivate 
individuals to leave them. This study introduces environments of synergy and 
dissonance utilising team production functions and utilises them to analyse how 
team environments vary in their propensity to generate spinoffs. We show that 
the teams exhibiting synergy are not likely to spawn spinoffs but a new idea 
from a team member gets implemented only if it is of exceptional quality. The 
concepts of synergy and dissonance can also be utilised to analyse other 
phenomena such as mergers and alliances. 
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1   Introduction 
 
Teams are an important organisational mechanism in several economic activities. Recent 
studies suggest that team formation has become a necessity to achieve the requisite 
diversity of talents for corporate success (Milliken et al, 2003; Jones, 2009).1 
Furthermore, innovations that require extensive knowledge are by necessity a result of 
team effort (Wuchty et al., 2007; Jones, 2009). Usually, a team therefore consists of 
individuals with heterogeneous talents who work together to fulfil a well defined 
objective. In addition to providing access to knowledge for immediate projects, a team 
acts as an important source of new ideas. Individuals within the team acquire knowledge 
sets, offer their expertise to others as required, learn from each other and internalise 
organisational goals (deVaro and Kurtulus, 2006; Garicano, 2000). 
A team exhibits organisational synergies if the expected output from team work 
exceeds the sum of outputs that the individuals can produce on their own. Synergies are a 
result of voluntary compliance of team members to organisational goals (Milliken et al., 
2003; Cornqvist et al., 2006; Magni et al., 2009).2 Team production may also reduce 
costs in relation to what can be achieved by market coordination. This constitutes another 
source of organisational synergy. 
Realising potential synergies in practice seem to require some preconditions. First, as 
Garicano and Hubbard (2009) argued, team members prefer autonomy as far as possible. 
Hence, team members comply and create synergies only if they participate in the decision 
making process or they know why certain decisions are taken. Second, the willingness to 
cooperate depends on the perception of equity in sharing gains. As Dessein et al. (2007) 
pointed out, compensation to team members should depend on their production effort and 
the time spent on coordination. Third, potential synergies can be realised if every team 
member offers his best effort to do his specific job and all the team members understand 
team goals and execute team work efficiently. A team is efficient and stable only when 
organisational synergies can be achieved. It lacks the fundamental synergy of being a 
team when it does not produce more output than the sum of individual outputs. 
Not all team environments exhibit synergies. Some team environments may 
experience dissonance and in such cases disadvantages of team production are discernible. 
For instance, Danzon et al. (2005) noted that there may be organisational dissonance as 
team size increases. In particular, coordination costs increase as team size increases partly 
due to the energy that must be utilised to resolve disagreements. Similarly, Wiggins 
(1995) pointed out that there may be limits to team size depending on the occurrence of 
organisational dissonance. Teams that have autonomy of decision making tend to 
emphasise their satisfaction at work while neglecting the viability of the team. In addition, 
Fulghieri and Hodrick (2006) noted that autonomous individuals may choose activities 
from which they cannot be displaced rather than choose the most profitable activities for 
the team. As a result an increase in team size leads to the possibility of free riding by 
individual members of the team. For following Alchian and Demsetz (1972), Klein et al. 
(1978) and Rose (2002), it may be noted that benefits of shirking accrue to the individual 
while the disadvantages and expenses must be borne by everybody in the team. 
Team members get new ideas with the accumulation of knowledge and expertise over 
time team. Such team members should be adequately compensated to retain them in the 
team. Otherwise, new ideas are another driver of spinoffs in addition to organisational 
dissonance (Chatterjee and Rossi-Hansberg, 2008). 
      
	  
 
Team production functions exhibit the organisation of production in a team and the 
extent to which team members are independent, or related to each other, within the team. 
Thus team production environments generate dissonance or synergy depending on the 
way individuals work together in a team. We show that the lack of synergy in team 
environments signals possibilities of spinoffs by team members. Individuals of any level 
of talent may find it advantageous to leave the team and start a firm on their own rather 
than working in a team exhibiting dissonance. However, there will be no spinoffs if every 
team member is getting the returns as they would have got working independently. 
The study is organised as follows. Section 2 is devoted to the specification of team 
production functions. Section 3 examines team stability and spinoff generation by 
analysing the nature of team production functions. Section 4 provides an analysis of how 
the environment in the pre-spinoff period is linked with the nature of spinoffs that occur. 
Section 5 examines the role of new ideas in a team environment in spinoff generation and 
how these ideas determine the occurrence of a spinoff. Section 6 summarises the findings 
of the study. 
 
 
2   Team production 
 
This section characterises synergy and dissonance using team production functions.3 
Assume a short run specification that capital equipment is already in place and not 
substitutable with labour. Owners of capital will be residual claimants of profits generated 
by the team. However, the team consists of individuals of diverse talents which may be 
substitutable in varying degrees. It is expected that team members willingly cooperate, 
comply with team goals and create synergies. For, the possibility of substitution among 
different talents motivates them to comply with team goals and contribute expected 
synergies. 
Assume that a team comprises of individuals with n talents. It is reasonable to postulate 
that there will be a few individuals at the highest level of talent (n) and the largest 
number of workers will have the lowest talent. Let xj; j = 1, 2, …, n denote the number 
of individuals with talent j. Then, by assumption, xj–1 > xj for all j = 2, 3, …, n. Further, xn 
= 1 will be postulated.4 The organisational production function can be written as 
(   β )α/β y =    ∑  x j , where 
y =  output, and 0 <  α, β <  1. 
Whatever may be the value of β  some shirking and free riding is possible leading to 
lesser output. This can be reflected by the specification of α.5 In particular, note that if all β  
xj  operate independently they produce an output y* =  ∑xj > 1. If they form a team  the 
resulting output is greater than y* if and only if α  > β. In general, organisational dissonance 
is signalled whenever α  < β. This is the foundation on which team stability and spinoffs 
from teams will be analysed further. 
Note that the existence of synergies is a property of the entire team. However, the 
decision to spinoff by an individual of talent j depends only on his returns. Any individual 
will leave the team if he expects to receive greater remuneration outside the 





team. The sharing scheme is important in explaining the spinoff process as disagreements 
within the team may pertain to sharing gains.6 
Disagreements within the team may also arise when a team member comes up with a 
new idea. The team may agree to implement the new idea if synergies are expected. 
However, disagreements between team members may arise due to information asymmetry 
about the profitability of the new idea.7 
In sum, spinoffs from a team may be due to the absence of synergies. For, in general, 
the reduction in output also indicates a decrease in wages. A spinoff may occur even in 
the presence of synergy if there is a disagreement about sharing output. Differences in the 
perception of synergies may result in either of the above reasons for a spinoff. 
 
 
3   Team formation, stability and spinoffs 
 
It is necessary to examine the reasons why individuals form teams in the first place before 
analysing team stability or spinoffs from it. The following proposition sets out the 
conditions for the formation of teams. 
Proposition 1: The emergence of diminishing returns to individual effort and the 
possibility of creating synergies from team formation are central to its emergence. 
Proof: Let individuals of only talent j produce the output to begin with. It is obvious that 
such an organisation will experience diminishing returns. The output will be 
y =  x β , β <  1 
Each individual receives a wage 
w  =  βx β−1 
They may realise that they can use their talents more efficiently if they form a team with 
individuals of another talent k. The emergence of synergies can be represented by the 
production function 
(    β β )α/β y =    x j +  xk ; α >  β 
 
The wages paid to an individual of talent j then becomes 
β−1 (   β β )α /β−1 
w jt  =  αx j x j   +  xk 
 
Observe that wjt > wj whenever α  > β  and xj, xk > 1. The possibility of deriving such 
benefits from synergies is at the apex of team formation and its stability in general.8 
We now analyse team environments that are likely to generate spinoffs. Within this 
framework, the team and its organisational structure will remain stable or less likely to 
encourage spinoffs if individuals of various talents receive higher wages (say, in 
comparison to what they can earn in other team environments). The following 
propositions outline the stability of team environments. 
Proposition 2: Teams that experience organisational synergies are not likely to spawn 
spinoffs. 




Proof: Recall that α  > β   is the only way to ascertain the existence of organisational β   α/β  
synergies. Consider the production function y = (∑xj      ) ;  α  >  β. The wages paid to  a 
β    α/β  – 1 β  – 1 
worker of talent j will be wj  = α(∑xj ) xj ; j = 1, 2, …, n. The owner of capital will 
receive p = (1 – α)y. If an individual of talent j contemplates a spinoff he has to form a 
team of  individuals  of  talent  k  =  1,  2,  …,  j.  Suppose  he  can  assemble  such 
a  team  without  sacrificing  any  synergy.  Then,  post  spinoff,  he  expects  to   receive wjs  = α(∑xkβ)α/β  – 1 xj . Note that wjs  ≤ wj  with the equality holding only for individuals β  – 1 
of the highest talent. Thus, it can be inferred that none of the team members will have any 
motivation to spinoff so long as the team maintains its synergy. This provides an insight 
into the empirical observation in the spinoff literature that acquisitions and mergers tend 
to increase the rate of spinoffs (Klepper and Thompson, 2010). For, they may signal 
difficulties in achieving expected synergies. 
Proposition 3: Suppose α  = β  and such teams are formed. They are not likely to spawn 
spinoffs. 
Proof: When α  = β   the production function reduces to y = ∑x α. In such production 
environments team members will be indifferent between forming a team versus working 
independently. However, they may work as a team due to the following reasons. First, if 
each team member needs to share capital equipment (a common resource to the team) it 
may be efficient for a coordinator to allocate capital to the team members but allow them 
to function independently. Buenstorf and Fornahl (2006) designate such a property of the 
production process as modularity. This represents the classic M-form organisation. 
Second, if they operate independently there may be costs of acquiring capital to produce 
a marketable product. However, the costs of coordination by market forces may far 
exceed those within the team. In such a case they prefer to form a team though the 
payments to individual members of the team are marginal products they contribute. When α  – 1 
a team is formed wage paid to a worker of talent j is wj  = αxj . It is independent of the 
contribution of others. If an individual of talent j operates his own team he will receive 
the same wages. Thus, he has nothing to gain by spinoff essentially due to the increased 
cost of coordination by the market. In such a case a spinoff will not be advantageous at 
all. In this context organisational synergies clearly consist of a reduction in the costs of 
coordination achieved by team formation. 
Thus, Proposition 1 suggests that individuals tend to form bigger teams if it is possible to 
achieve organisational synergies. Propositions 2 and 3 indicate that such teams remain 
stable so long as organisational synergies persist. 
In sum, if a team exhibits organisational dissonance apriori every individual in the 
team is better off if he spinsoff. Even individuals of low talent may prefer self-employment 
rather than working in a team riddled with dissonance. In teams exhibiting synergy every 
team member is better off while working within the team. At best the highest talented 
individuals may be indifferent between staying in or spinning off unless they can form a 
team with greater synergy. 
      
	  




4   Pre- and post-spinoff organisation 
 
Baccara and Razin (2007) noted that in addition to the environment of the current team 
the organisational structure of the new team is important as it determines the spinoff 
firm’s stability and performance. In addition to analysing team environments and their 
propensity to spawn spinoffs it is equally necessary to investigate how the current team 
and the new spinoff team environment determines whether there will be a spinoff or not. 
This section examines how types of team production functions prior to spinoff and post 
spinoff determine the emergence of spinoffs. 
To analyse this it is sufficient to consider a team of three different talented individuals 
where two of them create synergy and the third member triggers dissonance. The 
following proposition holds. 
Proposition 6: Initial organisational dissonance and synergies after spinoff are necessary 
to justify a spinoff. 
Proof: Assume that x1, x2, and x3 constitute a team which exhibits organisational 
dissonance. That is, the team production function is y = (∑xjβ)α/β; α  < β. Will an individual 
from x3 spinoff? It can be surmised that x3 requires a similar team to carry on production 
if he decides to spinoff. Hence, wages paid to an individual of talent 3 after spinoff will 
be such that w3s = w3. Consequently, individuals of the highest level of talent are not likely 
to spinoff. 
Will  an  individual  from  x2   spionff?  Within  the  existing  team  he  receives  a   wage β    α/β  – 1 
w2  = αx2β  –  1  (∑xj   ) . Post spinoff he may operate in a team consisting of x2  and    x1 
only. One possibility is that the smaller team enjoys synergy. In such a case the production 
function will be y = (x1β  + x2β)γ/β;  γ >  β. The corresponding  w2s  will  be γ(x1β  + x2β)γ/β  – 
1. It is then possible to have w2s > w2 if γ > β  > α. It follows that x2  gains by spinoff. 
Will an individual from x1  spinoff? Let the production function post spinoff be 
y = x α. Note that wages of this group of workers prior to spinoff are w  = αx β    –  1 
(∑x β)α/β    – 1 and post spinoff it will be w1s  =    αx1 
α    – 1 . Observe that w1s  > w1     whenever 
x1β  < ∑x1β  since α   < β. Hence, even lower talented individuals will spinoff from an 
environment experiencing dissonance if they are able to achieve synergies in smaller 
teams. It must be noted that in the post spinoff synergetic environment not only the team 
member who initiated spinoff but all other members of the team get higher wages. This is 
perfectly consistent with the experiences of startups in the Silicon Valley. 
Assume that we denote the talent to achieve synergy as an entrepreneurial talent such 
that a1< a2 < a3 = 1 where aj denotes the talent of individual j. The production function is 
then modified as y = a1x1 . In this setting w1s < w1 is possible. That is, lowest talented 
individuals will not spinoff purely because they do not have the talent to achieve synergy. 
In retrospect, it should be evident that the possibility of generating synergies post spinoff 
and/or superior talents of individuals induce a spinoff from a team which  cannot 
create synergies by integration. 




5   Quality of ideas and spinoffs 
 
Over time, with the accumulation of knowledge and experience, individuals get new 
ideas which may be in the form of new techniques for improvements in existing products. 
If the team member with the new idea is able to convince the existing team that it is 
profitable and creates synergies then the team may agree to compensate the innovator 
adequately by offering a share of monopoly rents so that he stays within the team. 
There may be disagreements between the innovating team member and the rest of the 
team if they are not convinced about the economic value of the innovation and/or their 
ability to implement it within the team. Furthermore there may be disagreements about 
adequate compensation even if the team agrees to implement the new idea. This may also 
lead to dissonance. Spinoff by a team member with a new idea is inevitable when the rest 
of the team members believe that dissonance cannot be reined in even after the 
introduction of the new innovation. In such a case the quality of the idea is important to 
determine whether there will be a spinoff or not. 
Assume that the team consists of n talents and organisational synergies exist initially. β   α/β  
Then, the team production function is y = (∑xj    ) . If the current team incorporates  the 
innovation without  sacrificing  its  synergies the production  function can be written  as 
y = τ (∑xjβ)α/β, where τ is the extent of productivity gain from the new idea. The synergies 
expected from implementing new ideas are least conducive to spinoff. The following 
proposition holds. 
Proposition 7: If organisational dissonance is expected after implementing the new idea 
in the team a spinoff is worthwhile only if the productivity gains from the quality of new 
ideas are adequately large. 
Proof: Assume that the original team did not agree to incorporate the innovative idea. It 
motivates the team member to spinoff and form a new team. Hence, let us assume that 
dissonance  is expected  in the new spinoff  team. The  new production function  will  be β   γ/β  
y = τ (∑xj   ) = τys; γ < β. If the individual representing xn  = 1 is the source of the   idea 
and creates a spinoff then the wages to xn  before and after spinoff are respectively wn     = 
αyxnβ – 1/∑x β and wns  = τγx β  – 1 ys/∑xjβ; γ < α  and ys< y. When will wns< wn? Invoking the 
result that yτ > ys we must have α/γ = τ* > τ. 
Hence, the individual talent n will not find it advantageous to spinoff if τ < τ*. In 
other words, a spinoff will occur if τ is large enough even when there is organisational 
dissonance after spinoff. That is, on the one hand, spinoff may occur if the idea is of high 
quality even if synergies cannot be achieved post spinoff. On the other hand, if the idea is 
of good quality and higher synergies are expected post spinoff then it is justifiable. This 
observation provides an insight into the empirically observed regularity that better firms 
tend to spawn more spinoffs since only greater synergies outside the team can motivate 
the individual to move out from a synergetic environment. 
      
	  
 
6   Conclusions 
 
Teams are formed to create synergies. However, some team environments are synergetic 
while others exhibit dissonance. An individual contemplates spinoff from a team to 
generate greater synergies in an alternative team environment when organisational 
dissonance results in low productivity and low wages in the current team. Thus the 
possibility of generating greater synergies in an alternative team environment is the source 
of discontent in the original team and is at the apex of spinoff generation. This study 
demonstrated that teams which experience dissonance are the least stable and tend to 
generate spinoffs. An individual of any talent is better off by spinning out than 
working in a team experiencing dissonance. Teams that experience synergy are less likely 
to spawn spinoffs. Higher talented individuals are not likely to spinoff unless they expect 
greater synergies in the new team to overcome the cost of forming the new team. This 
suggests that teams experiencing synergy, if at all, give rise to more synergetic spinoffs. 
The spinoffs may be due to new ideas but implementation of a new idea within the 
existing team is less likely when the existing team experiences synergy unless the new 
idea is of very good quality. Thus, when a team exhibits synergy, the quality of the new 
idea plays a very important role in spinoff generation. This provides an insight into the 
reluctance of better performing firms to pursue new ideas. They do so since they are 
afraid of losing current synergy. 
Throughout this study the possibility of an increase in wages was considered as the 
major driving force that motivates spinoffs. This may be due to synergies, better quality 
of ideas and/or superior talents of individuals who contemplate the spinoff. Alternatively, 
this can be interpreted to mean that the knowledge about the possibility of generating 
greater synergy in a spinoff will be the source of disagreements of working in the original 
team. 
However, an individual may prefer greater autonomy and dislike the bureaucracy of 
large firms. Similarly, as Ferrary (2008, p.608) noted, “spinoffs constitute a contract 
which is symbolically and psychologically motivating because it enables the researcher to 
identify with his project and to be identified with it through his social and professional 
milieu.” Also see Benz and Frey (2008). They will spinoff even under circumstances 
where they stand to gain due to the increased wages that they expect due to synergies of 
team formation. Usually, the spinoff must finance its activities from sources outside the 
team. In some cases, a spinoff may be based entirely on the possibility that stakeholders 
are convinced about the greater probability of success of the spinoff team. It is necessary 
to examine such alternatives within this framework to achieve greater generality. 
However, this dissonance and synergy theory can explain a number of insights that 
have emerged from other theories of spinoffs like the disagreements theory (Klepper and 
Thompson, 2010), opportunity and necessity theory (Buenstorf, 2009) and ideas theory 
(Chatterjee and Rossi-Hansberg, 2008). While the sheer variety of causes and types of 
spinoffs make it difficult to suggest an all inclusive theoretical framework, the generic 
form of the production function developed in this study can explain several types and 
instances of spinoff firms in reality. Furthermore, this study is the first to present a 
rigorous formulation of synergies and dissonance that has potential applications to 
mergers and alliances. 
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1   There is a fairly general agreement that teams with diverse talents are often more creative 
compared to homogeneous teams. Similarly, if team members worked at many different 
companies they bring unique ideas and contacts that encourage innovation. For instance, 
Beckman (2006) noted that team composition and members’ prior affiliations shape new firm 
behaviour. However, it appears that homogeneous teams manage implementation better while 
heterogeneous teams are more innovative. 
2   Alchian and Demsetz (1972) argued that two or more individuals working together may create 
synergies. Their example suggests that each of the two individuals may not be in a position to 
lift heavy equipment from a truck but they can do so working together. 
3   It will be assumed that the team is producing only one product. Such an assumption enables us 
to focus on team formation and the resulting synergies. Some synergies will also be due to an 
appropriate choice of the product range if the team produces many products. The requisite 
analysis will be quite similar. 
4   It may be argued that individuals from group j will have a productivity aj and that it will not be 
the same for all j. In such a case replace xj by zj = ajxj. zj–1 > zj for all j = 2, 3, …, n can still be 
maintained without any loss of generality. Another way of justifying the specification is to 
measure the units of xj in such a way that the productivity of xj is the same for all j. 
5   In this specification α  represents synergies for given xj. The usual interpretation of economies 
of scale applies only when all xj change proportionately. However, α  > β  signals an increase in 
output even if all xj do not increase proportionately. Arrow et al. (1961, p.247) acknowledged 
such ambiguity in the returns to scale interpretation. 
      
	  
 
6   Some aspects pertaining to contractual sharing have been examined in Adams (2005), deVaro 
and Kurtulus (2006) and Dessein et al. (2007). 
7   Cassiman and Ueda (2006) suggested that this pattern emerges whenever the original team does 
not have the organisational capacity to internalise large innovative projects. The possibility of 
cannibalisation of existing products and the inability to develop new markets add to their 
decision to reject the implementation of fairly large innovative ideas (e.g., Klepper and Sleeper, 
2005). 
8   Note that α  < 1 is a distinct possibility. Hence, there is an acknowledgement that bigger teams 
may also experience diminishing returns. As a result, the search for synergies through team 
expansion continues. 
